

Tor et ses .onion

Un système d'adressage « privacy by design »

Journée du Conseil scientifique de l'Afnic

11 juillet 2016


Lunar

lunar@torproject.org

0603 CCFD 9186 5C17 E88D 4C79 8382 C95C 2902 3DF9



The Tor Project



Our mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open privacy and anonymity technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use, and furthering their scientific and popular understanding.


Deep Dark Marina Abyssal Web





JOSEPH COX SECURITY 06.18.15 7:00 AM

**THE DARK WEB AS YOU KNOW
IT IS A MYTH**

... NOT about the **Dark Web**




- Online Anonymity
 - Open Source
 - Open Network
- Community of researchers, developers, users and relay operators.
- U.S. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization



7004 relays (3854 visible)
2016-07-09 15:00:00

Usual Tor connections





Mon blog



Autres trucs

[Accueil](#)

[Seulement les RFC](#)

[Seulement les fiches de lecture](#)

[Évo](#)

Mon blog dans les oignons

Première rédaction de cet article le 15 janvier 2015


Dernière mise à jour le 25 février 2015

Cela faisait longtemps que je voulais m'amuser avec cela, donc, désormais, ce blog est désormais également accessible en [Tor hidden service](#), c'est-à-dire avec un [nom de domaine](#) en [.onion](#).

Quel est l'intérêt de faire cela ? Le réseau [Tor](#) est connu pour permettre une connexion aux services de l'Internet qui soit [anonyme](#) (attention à votre sécurité toutefois : aucune technique n'est parfaite et rien n'est jamais complètement anonyme) et qui résiste à la censure. Tor assure ce service en **relayant** chaque requête par plusieurs nœuds Tor. Seul le premier connaît le client initial (il ne

Tor Hidden Services: 6

Step 6: Bob and Alice proceed to use their Tor circuits like normal.



-  Tor cloud
-  Tor circuit
-  Introduction points
-  Public key
-  One-time secret
-  Rendezvous point

Onion Service Properties

Self authenticated


Distributed directory

End-to-end encrypted


NAT punching

Unique .onion addresses

Unique .onion addresses




Estimated Traffic



Estimated Traffic

As of December 2015,

~5% of **client** traffic is HS



Statistics

Proposal 238

[https://research.torproject.org/
techreports/extrapolating-hidserv-stats-2015-01-31.pdf](https://research.torproject.org/techreports/extrapolating-hidserv-stats-2015-01-31.pdf)



Birth - 2004



ChangeLog file entry:

Changes in version 0.0.6pre1 - 2004-04-08

- o Features:

- Hidden services and rendezvous points are implemented. Go to <http://6sxoyfb3h2nvok2d.onion/> for an index of currently available hidden services. (This only works via a socks4a proxy such as Privoxy, and currently it's quite slow.)

Early use case - 2006



Wikileaks - 2007



Wikileaks:Tor

(Redirected from [Tor](#))

The following method requires some technical ability. If you are used to installing new software and configuring proxy servers you should have the required skills, otherwise you may wish to use one of our [other submission methods](#). Don't let the technology defeat you!

Tor or The Onion Router is a cryptographic technique first implemented by US navy research to permit intelligence agents to use the internet without being traced, by encrypting and routing communications through many different internet servers. Subsequently Tor has been developed by US University [MIT](#) and the California internet rights watchdog the [Electronic Frontier Foundation](#) and subsequently incorporated into [Wikileaks](#).

Using our anonymous access package ([see below](#)) you can prevent internet spies knowing that your computer has connected to [Wikileaks](#).

Most Wikileakers will not need this extra security and there are simpler and possibly safer alternatives for once-off high-risk leaks (see [Submissions](#)). But for those who are at risk and want to access Wikileaks from the comfort of their homes or offices or need to bypass [Internet Censorship](#), Tor ([Onion Routing](#)) is an excellent solution.

When you have installed our Tor access package (see below), you may then connect to [Wikileaks](#) via our anonymous address (the ".onion" is short for "Onion Routing", but you do not need to be concerned with this detail).

Then whenever you want to establish an encrypted anonymous (even to internet spies) connection to [Wikileaks](#) goto our magic link:

<http://gaddbiwdfapglkq.onion/>

(this link will only work once you have installed and configured Tor)

To upload a document anonymously using tor:

<http://gaddbiwdfapglkq.onion/wiki/Special:Leak>

(this link will only work once you have installed and configured Tor)

Unless your memory is superb you may wish to write that address down, but make sure you discard the paper after you are finished with it.

Without Tor, when you access a Wikileaks site the usual way, e.g via <https://wikileaks.org/> all your data is encrypted, but internet spies maybe able note how long your computer spent talking to Wikileaks servers. See [Connection Anonymity](#) for further discussion.

GlobalLeaks - 2011




Today, more than 30 projects use GlobalLeaks

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GlobalLeaks#Implementations>




SecureDrop - 2013



Today, 22 organizations use SecureDrop


<https://securedrop.org/directory>


And Facebook Too - 2015



And Facebook Too - 2015

- No more worrying about **bad** certificate authorities
- Avoids exit relay contention, traffic **never leaves** the network!






And Facebook Too - 2015

- No more worrying about **bad** certificate authorities
- Avoids exit relay contention, traffic **never leaves** the network!
- Ultimately it could be **faster** than reaching Facebook with a normal Tor circuit


Rendezvous Single Onion Services (RSOS)

Proposal 260



Single Onion Services (SOS)


Proposal 252




The circuit is extended to the service.
No Introduction nor Rendezvous.

OnionBalance - TSoP

<https://onionbalance.readthedocs.org>



.onion and EV cert



- Browsers know to treat cookies/etc like **TLS**
- Server-side does **not** need to treat .onion specially
- With an EV cert, the browser shows the user that it's **really** Facebook

Subdomain support

Proposal 204



`www.facebookcorewwi.onion`
connects to
`facebookcorewwi.onion`


Magic of .onion EV certs!

Onion SSL Certificates have a
magic extra feature,

The only EV SSL Certs which can
use wildcards!


OnionShare

<https://onionshare.org/>



Ricochet

<https://ricochet.im>



RFC7686 - 2015


Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Request for Comments: 7686
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721

J. Appelbaum
The Tor Project, Inc.
A. Muffett
Facebook
October 2015

The ".onion" Special-Use Domain Name

Abstract

This document registers the ".onion" Special-Use Domain Name.




The screenshot shows a web browser window with a single tab titled "Blog Stéphane Bortz...". The address bar displays the URL "www.bortzmeyer.org/7686.html". The page content features a blue header with the text "Mon blog". Below this, there is a black square with the white text "JE SUIS CHARLIE". To the right of the image, the title "RFC 7686: The .onion Special-Use Domain Name" is displayed in blue. The body of the post contains the following text: "Date de publication du RFC : Octobre 2015", "Auteur(s) du RFC : J. Appelbaum (The Tor Project.), A. Muffett (Facebook)", "Chemin des normes", "Réalisé dans le cadre du groupe de travail IETF [dnsop](#)", and "Première rédaction de cet article le 24 octobre 2015".

Blog Stéphane Bortz... x +

www.bortzmeyer.org/7686.html Recherche »

Mon blog



[RFC 7686](#): The .onion Special-Use Domain Name

Date de publication du RFC : Octobre 2015
Auteur(s) du RFC : J. Appelbaum (The Tor Project.), A. Muffett (Facebook)
Chemin des normes
Réalisé dans le cadre du groupe de travail IETF [dnsop](#)
Première rédaction de cet article le 24 octobre 2015

Setup

```
# apt-get get install tor
# cat << EOF
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/blog/
HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
EOF
# killall -HUP tor
# cat /var/lib/tor/blog/hostname
7j3ncmar4jm2r3e7.onion
```

⚠ Watch out for leaks! e.g. /server-status/

Access control



Proposal 121

Sur le serveur :

HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient *stealth user*

Sur le client :

HidServAuth ww2ufwkgxb2kag6t.onion



ErQPDEHdNNprvWYCA2vTLR

La clé se trouve dans Tor/Data/hostname

Current Security Problems

- Onion identity keys are **too short**!
- You can choose relay identity keys to **target** a particular onion service
- You can run relays to **harvest** onion addresses
- **Sybil** attacks remain an issue for Tor in general
- Guard **discovery** attack (proposal 247)
- Website **fingerprinting** for onion services?

Tor Hidden Services: 1


Step 1: Bob picks some introduction points and builds circuits to them.



Alice



DB



Tor cloud



Tor circuit

IP1-3

Introduction points

PK

Public key

cookie

One-time secret

RP

Rendezvous point


Bob

Tor Hidden Services: 2

Step 2: Bob advertises his hidden service -- XYZ.onion -- at the database.



Alice



Tor cloud



Tor circuit

IP1-3

Introduction points

PK

Public key

cookie


One-time secret

RP

Rendezvous point


Tor Hidden Services: 3

Step 3: Alice hears that XYZ.onion exists, and she requests more info from the database. She also sets up a rendezvous point, though she could have done this before.




Tor Hidden Services: 4

Step 4: Alice writes a message to Bob (encrypted to PK) listing the rendezvous point and a one-time secret, and asks an introduction point to deliver it to Bob.




Tor Hidden Services: 5

Step 5: Bob connects to the Alice's rendezvous point and provides her one-time secret.




Tor Hidden Services: 6

Step 6: Bob and Alice proceed to use their Tor circuits like normal.



HS Directory


Desc ID = $H(\text{onion-address} \mid H(\text{time-period} \mid \text{descriptor-cookie} \mid \text{replica}))$



HSDir Predictability

Desc ID = H(onion-address |
H(**time-period** | descriptor-cookie | replica))

 Invariant



Next Generation Onion Service (NGOS)

Proposal 224

blob: 8dd30b0e95d4ff5695eebd7a73f894ce825bc587 ([plain](#))

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 | Filename: 224-rend-spec-ng.txt |
| 2 | Title: Next-Generation Hidden Services in Tor |
| 3 | Author: Nick Mathewson |
| 4 | Created: 2013-11-29 |
| 5 | Status: Draft |

Created: 2013-11-29

[https://blog.torproject.org/blog/
mission-montreal-building-next-generation-onion-services](https://blog.torproject.org/blog/mission-montreal-building-next-generation-onion-services)




Shared Randomness

Proposal 250

Desc ID = H(**onion-address** |
H(**time-period** | **random-value** | **descriptor-cookie** | **replica**))

■ Invariant



Better Crypto



Bigger Onion Address

From 16 characters:

nzh3fv6jc6jskki3.onion

... to 52 characters:

a1uik0w1gmfq3i5ievxdm9ceu27e88g6o7pe0rffdw9jmntwkdsd.onion

(ed25519 public key base32 encoded)

... or maybe something else :

correct-battery-horse-staple-chair-banana-table-river-pizza.onion

... or another encoding...

Meaningful names for .onion?

Self-authentication is somewhat a lie...

- In DNS: .onion must be stored in TXT records
(unless you use the OnionCat trick / fake Ipv6)
- Shareable address book(s)?
- Namecoin?
- OnioNS?
- Let's Encrypt!?

Onion services vs IP

Global routing requires common policy

- Hierarchical authorities
- Unauthenticated
- Metadata and payload visible to 3rd parties
- ... ?

Onion services vs DNS

Human-meaningful

- Hierarchical, decentralized
- Partially authenticated (DNSSEC)
- Metadata and payload visible to 3rd parties
- ... ?

Thanks!

Lunar
lunar@torproject.org

0603 CCFD 9186 5C17 E88D
4C79 8382 C95C 2902 3DF9

